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	‘Polemic: devaluing of all other pictures; provocation of the viewer, who sees himself instead of a picture’: thus Gerhard Richter, reflecting on the effects of mirrors when placed in the art gallery (Obrist 2002: 99). At least since the construction of 4 Panes of Glass in 1967, mirrors and glass - installed, sculpted, framed - have become part of Richter’s aesthetic idiom, its attempt to make an object ‘provocatively perfect’ (Godfrey et. al. 2011: 23). The recent major retrospective of Richter’s work at Tate Modern, London - Gerhard Richter: Panorama ran from October 2011 to January 2012 - included 4 Panes of Glass, Double Pane of Glass (1977), Mirror (1981), 11 Panes (2004) and 6 Panes of Glass in a Rack (2002-11). Reflecting on the chronological trajectory as well as the thematic preoccupations of Richter’s oeuvre, the curators of Panorama dispersed these works amongst Richter’s paintings, photo-paintings and colour charts. 4 Panes of Glass, for example, was installed in the second room  of the exhibition, ‘Art after Duchamp’, helping to secure the dialogue between Richter’s installation and Marcel Duchamp’s The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even - also known as The Large Glass - produced between 1915 and 1923. Double Pane of Glass - two sheets of glass, made opaque by grey paint - was shown alongside the grey paintings and colour charts on which Richter was working from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s; Mirror - the work that helped to prompt this article - was hung to reflect a group of abstract colour paintings from the early 1980s, including Hedge (1982: hung directly opposite Mirror), Yellow-green (1982) and Abstract Painting (1983).
	First shown at Städtische Kunsthalle in Düsseldorf in 1981, Mirror is, as Richter explains in interview, a ‘piece of bought mirror. Just hung there, without any addition’ (Obrist 2002: 272). Not framed, not made, there is nothing to distinguish Mirror from any other mirror apart from Richter’s decision to hang it on the wall of a gallery; ready-made, then, or to borrow André Breton’s description of that scandalous mode of not making art: ‘an ordinary object promoted to the dignity of art object simply by way of the artist’s choice’ (Breton, cited by de Duve 1996: 93).  That is, Mirror belongs to a tradition of aesthetic endeavour that finds its icon in Duchamp’s Fountain - the urinal not exhibited at the Grand Central Palace in New York in 1917 - and its cause in the promotion of the autonomy of the art object (art is what an artist calls ‘art’ - a tautology unpacked, with exhaustive flair, by de Duve in Kant After Duchamp).
Polemic, provocation: Richter knows what he is doing with his Mirror, its intervention in the history of making and looking at pictures. On the attack, Mirror devalues pictures: painting or photograph, what art can compete with its flawless reproduction of the world in flux? What picture - abstract, realist, still, moving - can rival its continuous, if transient, capture of colour, line, blur, movement? Above all, perhaps, it connives against the conventions of looking at images made to be seen, visible, in the here and now, once and for all (what T.J. Clark has described as the ‘fiction of visibility’ supporting our ways of thinking and writing about images (Clark 2006: 9)). By contrast, to look at Mirror is to look at whatever happens to be caught up in that reflecting surface. Hanging there, it mirrors what comes before it: pictures, people, objects, spaces. ‘Even,’ Richter acknowledges, ‘at the risk of being boring’ (Obrist 2002: 272). Propped on the world, it loses - if it ever had - that much-vaunted autonomy of the ready-made. To look at Mirror is to change it. It has no identity with itself (what Theodor Adorno describes as the inherent desire of every artwork); nor can it stabilise the images that it reflects back into the world (Adorno 1997: 5). At rest, Mirror cannot be seen. Reproduced on the page, for example, Mirror is no longer a mirror; it loses its capacity to reflect, becoming a photograph of a mirror and its reflections, made immobile, unchanging. In this sense, it is impossible to ‘see’ Mirror, impossible to stabilise its ‘meaning’. As art object, as image, it exists in the flow of time and movement; it is at once immediate and elusive, tedious and vital. ‘For surviving this world’ is Richter’s response when asked, in interview, about the purpose of art: ‘like bread, like love,’ he continues (Godfrey et. al. 2011: 24). An object to live with, then, in a world struck by need and desire: wondrous, everyday, ready-made. 
Does Mirror matter? What does it matter to the ongoing dialogue between psychoanalysis and studies in the visual field? Putting pressure on our ways of looking at and thinking about pictures, Mirror can solicit a form of attention in which interpretation gives way to reflection, object gives place to environment. As such, it can become an object to think with about what appears to be a moment of transition - and, for me, revived potential - in the relation between psychoanalysis and the image: today, on the cusp between psychoanalysis and the visual field, there is a ‘turn’ towards the writings of D.W. Winnicott and, more broadly, the British Independent Tradition nurtured by both his writings and his practice.​[1]​ Environment, mirror: two of the most significant words in Winnicott’s lexicon, used to explore what he calls ‘dependence [as] a living fact’, with all the consequences of that fact for his intervention in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis (Winnicott 1974: 103). In particular, ‘Mirror-role of Mother and Family in Child Development’, first published in 1967, is an invitation to revisit the figure of the mirror in terms of the relation between psychoanalysis and the image.​[2]​ Ever since Freud’s advice to the would-be analyst in 1912 that he should remain ‘opaque to his patients and, like a mirror ... show them nothing but what is shown to him’, the mirror has been one of the founding metaphors of psychoanalytic practice: a strange mirror, certainly, the analyst reflecting not the visible but the hidden and removed from the patient’s field of vision (Freud’s technical innovation in the 1890s that, as Kenneth Wright points out, has left a gap in psychoanalysis where the face should be) (Freud 1912:  118; Wright 1991). But a mirror that - as metaphor, as object - draws psychoanalysis into the long history of human wondering about reflection and perception, image and illusion, visible and invisible (that fascinating world beyond the looking-glass).​[3]​ 
It’s a history that agitates through the various encounters between psychoanalysis and the visual field: notably, the rapid development of a psychoanalytic film theory, or ‘Screen’ theory, grounded in the figure of the mirror. ‘Thus film is like the mirror’: in 1975, Christian Metz’s groundbreaking, if wayward, analogy was propped on Jacques Lacan’s ‘Le Stade du Miroir’ and, more broadly, Lacan’s concept of the imaginary; however flawed - ‘this mirror,’ Metz acknowledged, ‘returns us everything but ourselves’; it is another ‘strange mirror’ - it helped to create a body of work poised to engage the ‘passion for perceiving’ (to borrow Metz’s phrase) through the discipline of psychoanalysis (Metz 1982: 45; 49; 58). Or more precisely, through the work of Freud and Lacan. The encounter between psychoanalysis and the visual field has been, and often remains, deeply engaged with the concepts emerging from Freud’s analysis of sexuality and sexual difference in the 1920s and 1930s (identification, voyeurism, fetishism, castration, disavowal) and from Lacan’s incomparable ‘return to Freud’ (imaginary, symbolic, real, gaze, suture, objet petit a, sinthome). One way of telling the recent history of psychoanalytic film theory, for example, is to say that, since the 1960s, it has arrived in two ‘waves’, both of them generated by Lacan (be it the Lacan of identification and the imaginary or the Lacan of the real and the gaze).​[4]​ That the second wave arrives in the mode of a corrective of the first does nothing to disturb the Lacanian edifice; on the contrary, rehearsal of the primal scene of Lacanian film theory, its origins in a supposed misunderstanding of the screen as mirror, may well strengthen its ground. ‘Believing itself to be following Lacan, it conceives the screen as mirror; in doing so, however, it operates in ignorance of, and at the expense of, Lacan’s more radical insight, whereby the mirror is conceived as a screen’: in 1989, Joan Copjec’s intervention set the terms for a renewal of Lacanian film theory that, continuing to hold sway, puts Lacan’s concept of the gaze, its attention to the domains of the invisible and the absent, at the heart of its project (Copjec 1999: 15-16). At stake is both a reading of Lacan - the concept of the gaze and the break, if that is what it is, introduced by The Ethics of Psychoanalysis in 1959-1960 - and the position of Lacan as what, at the beginning of The Fright of Real Tears, Slavoj Zizek describes as the ‘ultimate background’ of psychoanalytic film theory (Zizek 2001: 2). 
That this is a form of dogma, brilliant in its very blindspots, is part of its fascination and its provocation. Most provocative, perhaps, in so far as the ‘new Lacanianism’ (or what Stephen Heath once described as ‘Zizek-film’) enforces a type of interruption of the psychoanalysis of cinema that came before it (and, possibly, that which comes afterwards) (Heath 1999: 45).​[5]​  Recast as the symptoms of a narrow, and fatally mistaken, reading of Lacan, the idea of the mirror and the imaginary - and, with them, the dialogue between psychoanalysis and cinema as institutions, or apparatuses, with distinctive forms and practices - are relegated to the margins of an erroneous history.​[6]​ Marginalised, too, are those forms of psychoanalytic film theory not identified with the Lacanian cause: in Todd McGowan’s recent summary, whilst there have been works of film theory engaged with, say, Melanie Klein, Winnicott or Carl Jung, they are ‘isolated’ (McGowan’s term: it is an especially freighted word) from the ‘primary source’ that is Jacques Lacan.​[7]​ ‘Paths not taken,’ as Lisa Cartwright has recently summarised the (non) relation between film theory and psychoanalysis beyond the Lacanian tradition (Cartwright is especially concerned with Winnicott’s object relations theory (Cartwright 2008: 11)).   
In other words, the mirror in question in film theory derives from an influential, but only partial, exploration of the vicissitudes of the mirror in psychoanalysis. Whilst Lacan’s ‘Le Stade du Miroir’ became one of the founding texts of psychoanalytic film theory, Winnicott’s intervention passed unnoticed, or unused, in writings on cinema and spectatorship.​[8]​ But that Winnicott was not there the first time around is part of the significance of ‘Mirror-role of Mother and Family’, its capacity to intervene in what we think we know about mirrors and screens - no doubt, Metz’s passing comment on the ‘subterranean persistence of the exclusive relation to the mother’ in his discussion of Lacan’s imaginary is agitating through what I’m saying - and, crucially, to respond to the provocation to thinking about images embodied in Richter’s Mirror (Metz 1982: 4). From the very beginning of ‘Mirror-role of Mother and Family’, Winnicott takes the idea of the mirror and gives it back to us differently, elusively: 
In individual emotional development the precursor of the mirror is the mother’s face. I wish to refer to the normal aspect of this and also to its psychopathology.
	Jacques Lacan’s paper ‘Le Stade du Miroir’ (1949) has certainly influenced me. He refers to the use of the mirror in each individual’s ego development. However, Lacan does not think of the mirror in terms of the mother’s face in the way that I wish to do here. (Winnicott 1999: 111)
	
	‘Mirror-role of Mother and Family’ is Winnicott’s only explicit, if elusive, response to Lacan’s ‘Le Stade du Miroir’; as such, it is a tantalising object for those of us exploring the relation between psychoanalysis and the image (‘[I]f we are good,’ as Winnicott puts it in 1958, ‘we are also tantalising. We offer something, but we seem to withhold it’ (Winnicott 1958: 425). To discover Winnicott reading Lacan, or to imagine him discussing the mirror stage with the patient, a woman, central to ‘Mirror-role of Mother and Family’ - ‘the patient went on to speak of ‘Le Stade du Miroir’ because she knows of Lacan’s work, but she was not able to make the link that I feel I am able to make between the mirror and the mother’s face’ - is to be given the opportunity to resist an apparent opposition between the two that, as André Green suggests, has sustained a split within contemporary psychoanalysis (I will come back to this) (Winnicott 1999: 117; Green 2011: 29). The face and the self; looking and seeing; reflecting and recognizing: these are the terms that will govern ‘Mirror-role of Mother and Family’ as, putting the mother before the mirror, Winnicott forges an extraordinarily subtle account of the origins of a self in the work and the risk of looking and being looked at. In fact, the infant, seeing himself seen by the mother-mirror, becomes the very figure of the emergence of self, mind and creativity: 
What does the baby see when he or she looks at the mother’s face? I am suggesting that, ordinarily, what the baby sees is himself or herself. In other words the mother is looking at the baby and what she looks like is related to what she sees there. All this is too easily taken for granted. I am asking that this which is naturally done well by mothers who are caring for their babies shall not be taken for granted. I can make my point by going straight over to the case of the baby whose mother reflects her own mood or, worse still, the rigidity of her own defences. In such a case what does the baby see? (Winnicott 1999: 112)
	All this, Winnicott tells us, ‘belongs to the beginning’ and, in attempting to present it, he draws on the words of those patients ‘who can verbalize (when they feel they can do so) without insulting the delicacy of what is preverbal, unverbalized, and unverbalizable except perhaps in poetry‘ (ibid.).  Or, perhaps, in the image, be it verbal and visual. The woman with whom Winnicott discusses Lacan is also preoccupied by the paintings of Francis Bacon: she is reading Ronald Alley and John Rothenstein’s catalogue to the retrospective of Bacon’s work which opened at the Tate Galley in May 1962 and draws Winnicott’s attention to Bacon’s preference for glazing his paintings : ‘he likes to have glass over his pictures because then when people look at the picture what they see is not just a picture; they might in fact see themselves’ (shades of Richter’s Mirror) (ibid.: 117). ‘Wouldn’t it be awful,’ she exclaims in the course of her session, ‘if a child looked into the mirror and saw nothing!’ (ibid.: 116). It’s a stark, and unsettling, vision: a child, a mirror, a reflection - of the self, of the world - that, because it is not there, becomes awful; not reflecting, the mirror has become a bizarre object, visible but empty. An object to be looked at, but not into. Like the face of a mother who looks at you but does not make you visible? ‘In individual emotional development,’ Winnicott insists, ‘the precursor of the mirror is the mother’s face‘ (ibid.: 111).
	The child who cannot find her reflection; the painter who takes his chance with ours: Winnicott will track the ties between the two back to the earliest responses between mother and baby. Let’s recall that elsewhere Winnicott describes the mother who emerges in the very earliest phases of her baby’s life as in a state of ‘primary maternal preoccupation’, ‘given over to’ her baby in a form of withdrawal from the world (including, to some extent, her self) (Winnicott 1963: 85). Something like a state of fugue, a phase of ‘normal illness’, the idea of primary maternal preoccupation is essential to Winnicott’s exploration of the origins of illusion, imagination and creativity. Nothing less than a reversal of reality takes place via this state in which the mother, identifying with her baby’s states of body, need, feeling, mind, creates an environment in which that baby can experience her absolute helplessness - specific prematurity of birth, in Lacan’s terms,  dependence as a living fact, in Winnicott’s - as a form of magical (illusory) omnipotence (Lacan 2002). The wager is extraordinary but, Winnicott insists, profoundly ordinary, too (or, as Green suggests, Winnicott noticed ‘what had been escaping everyone’s attention’ (Green 1996: 287)). 
	‘Mirror-role of Mother and Family’ presents Winnicott’s most sustained reflection on the significance of the mother’s face - her capacity to look at her baby and to see what is there - to that ordinary-extraordinary care. The exchange of looks between two belongs to the environment: the mother’s capacity to look at and to give back what she sees in her baby is part of that care; her face, her looking, are forms of holding, handling and object-presenting (the three elements of the environmental function outlined by Winnicott at the beginning of ‘Mirror-role of the Mother and Family’: on one reading, the mirror could be described as the royal road to the environment for Winnicott).  In looking at her baby, the mother’s face changes in time (moves, animates) in relation to what she sees in and of her baby: ‘the mother is looking at the baby and what she looks like is related to what she sees there.’ Brought to bear on a scene at once simple and spectacular, it is worth noting the nuance of Winnicott’s words at this point. Not everything is, or can be, caught up in the mother’s face, or the gift of her looking back, that, for Winnicott, creates the ground for the ‘creative apperception [very schematically, seeing oneself being seen by the mother]... that makes the individual feel that life is worth living’ (Winnicott 1999: 65).  (This is also what Winnicott describes, in a few comments on Bacon, as ‘creative looking’ (ibid.: 114).) The not-seen, the not-reflected - what, in a different context, Juliet Mitchell has inflected as a ‘primal nonrecognition’ - agitates through Winnicott’s discussion of the mother’s face be it ‘good enough’ (alive, reflecting but not-all) or, at the other end of the spectrum, still, paralyzed, full of the mother’s mood, ‘dead’ (Mitchell 1998: 124). In such cases, the mother’s face - her face, reflecting her moods, her defences - becomes too visible, too perceptible, to the baby, who then loses the potential for self emerging in that precious space between the seen and unseen. The baby looks, Winnicott concludes, but he does not see himself: ‘what is seen is the mother’s face. The mother’s face is not then a mirror’ (Winnicott 1999: 113). 
To put these points another way: the limits of perception become tangible in that imaginary scene in which a child, standing before the mirror, sees nothing. The phrase may strain our capacity to visualise, but the patient’s sense of its terror orients us towards an aspect of the visual field characterised by blankness, emptiness, non-presence. We are some way here from Lacan’s fascination with the baby, captivated by the image of his reflection, craning towards the mirror. This is not the domain of mis-recognition, the lure of the image, that psychoanalysis has done so much to explain. By contrast, Winnicott is excavating the maternal dimension of the visual field, its dependence on the structuring function of the mother: as a type of spectacle, the mother’s face bears the distinction between movement and stillness, life and death, human and inhuman (think, for example, of the special status accorded to the smile, or what Michael Eigen describes as the ‘home base of the human self’ (Eigen 1980: 55). ‘[The baby] learns to distinguish animate objects from inanimate ones,’ writes René Spitz in 1945, ‘by the spectacle provided by his mother’s face’ (Spitz 1945: 67). Or, to go back to Winnicott, ‘the mother is looking at the baby and what she looks like is related to what she sees there’: the baby’s experience of being alive, of being seen, comes back to her but relatively, differently. In relation, not reproduction.
Relation, not reproduction: the terms take us back to Richter’s Mirror. What matters, I think, is that relation in reflection, a reflective relation, coming right to the fore between an artwork and its viewers in Mirror. That shift from object to environment, interpretation to reflection is one that runs throughout ‘Mirror-role of Mother and Family’ sustained by Winnicott’s conversations with his patients, their shared uses of Lacan and Francis Bacon, psychoanalysis and visual culture ( Bacon, Winnicott insists, is an artist who ‘forces his way into any present day discussion of the face and the self’; in Bacon’s looking at faces, in his distortion of the human face, there is a painful ‘striving towards being seen‘ (Winnicott 1999: 114)). Crucially, if one of the fascinations of ‘Mirror-role of Mother and Family’ is its opening wager with Lacan, the other is its remarkable intervention on the limits of interpretation in the practice of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy. ‘Psychotherapy is not making clever and apt interpretations,’ Winnicott insists, reflecting on the analyst’s task in the light of his discovery of the ties between mirror and mother; ‘by and large it is a long-term giving the patient back what the patient brings. It is a complex derivative of the face that reflects what is there to be seen’ (Winnicott 1999: 117). Embedded in this statement is the history, and theory, of Winnicott’s analytic practice (a practice that is still being understood). There is also a challenge to the predominance of the work of interpretation in our uses of psychoanalysis in visual and cultural studies. What might we do other than or as well as interpret? That is also, I think, the question of Richter’s Mirror - the ways in which it holds or handles us, the environment it creates. 

Postscript
Winnicott and Lacan can seem an unlikely pair. But, reflecting on the perceived opposition, Green has insisted on the convergence between Winnicott and Lacan derived from one of the fundamental questions of psychoanalysis, namely: ‘how is it that by means of speech we change something in the structure of the subject, whereas what we change does not belong to the field of speech?’ (Clancier and Kalmanovitch 1987: 121). Emphasising their shared preoccupation with that beyond of the field of speech - what, as we’ve seen, Winnicott refers to as the unverbalisable - Green points to the importance, as well as the challenge, of bringing Winnicott and Lacan together in the study of the relation between psychoanalysis and the image. Beyond speech, the psychoanalytic method - talking, listening, the ‘setting’ -  refers to or represents something that, whilst having to find expression in words, exists, and persists, beyond them. How that ‘something’ is conceived - how or what we think about it - may well depend on our understanding of the psychoanalytic method or model (dream, drive, environment, for example).  But that psychoanalysis mediates between language and forms of experience and expression that cannot be caught up into words is part of the wager of its intervention in our ways of thinking about the visual field.  Finding the words to say it is certainly one way to describe the process of a psychoanalysis; it could also describe the struggle to forge a language responsive to the difference of our experience of the visual field (what Clark has recently called its precious distance from verbal discourse).​[9]​ 
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^1	  Bringing together the work of the Transitional Phenomena and Cultural Experience study group (T-PACE: http://www.sllf.qmul.ac.uk/filmstudies/t_pace/index.html), the publication of Little Madnesses: Winnicott, Transitional Phenomena and Cutural Experience is one example of such a turn. Edited by Annette Kuhn, this volume covers a wide range of cultural objects but there is a marked emphasis on visual experience. Similarly, the recent ‘Moving Objects: Film, Relation, Change’ conference at Birkbeck, London (January 2014) put object relations theory at the heart of its exploration of psychoanalysis and the moving image. 
^2	  ‘Mirror-role of Mother and Family in Child Development’ was first published in The Predicament of the Family: A Psycho-Analytical Symposium, edited by Peter Lomas, in 1967, and then republished, posthumously, in Winnicott’s Playing and Reality in 1971 - described by André Green as ‘the most important psychoanalytic work since Freud’s death’ (Green 2011: 43).
^3	  For a fascinating history of the mirror, see Melchior-Bpnnet 2002.
^4	  Todd McGowan’s entry on Psychoanalytic Film Theory for Oxford Bibliographies online exemplifies this mode of telling history: http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199791286/obo-9780199791286-0052.xml (last accessed 6th February 2014). This free online article essentially re-states the Introduction to McGowan 2008.
^5	  The effect is not unlike that of the repression described by Lacan, in fact, in his seminar on Freud’s papers on technique, delivered as part of the training programme of the Société Française de Psychanalyse between 1953 and 1954. Picking up on the phrase ‘le mot me manque’ - ‘the word escapes me’ - Lacan draws his audience’s attention to the work of repression in the domain of discourse: ‘Because, and make a careful note of this,’ he exhorts, ‘each time that repression takes place ... there is always interruption of discourse. The subject says that the word escapes him’ (Lacan 1988: 268). A ‘repression of discourse’ may be one way to describe the occlusion of the mirror and the imaginary taking place in that ‘second wave’ of Lacanian film theory. 
^6	  His focus is not on the mirror but Stephen Heath makes a similar point: ‘...it is indicative that Zizek has, in fact, little to say about “institution,” “apparatus,” and so on, all the concerns of the immediately preceding attempts to think cinema and psychoanalysis (films and novels will thus mostly be referred to without any particular distinction between them as forms)’ (1999: 44).
^7	  See fn 4 for references. Put that way, the task of the film scholar can quickly become that of distinguishing between the thinkers who ‘engage with’ or ‘appropriate’ Lacan and those who fully endorse him (the terms are Zizek’s who accepts only Copjec and some un-named Slovene colleagues as Lacanians in this strong and somewhat unnerving sense (Zizek 2001: 2). Or, perhaps, of mounting a defence of the bastions of film theory against encroachment by a reading of Lacan that is not Lacanian enough (not ‘good enough’, you might say). In a recent critique of Copjec’s criticism of the ‘first wave’ Lacanians, Henry Krips calls for a ‘more Lacanian account of the panoptic gaze’ to correct her, Copjec’s, misreading of Foucault (Krips 2010: 92). The problem with this, as I see it, is that neither defends the need to make theory - a commitment to thinking wedded to de-disciplinisation - nor counters the effects of ‘dire mastery’ to borrow Routstang’s phrase that continue to fuel the criticisms of (psychoanalytic) theory as a dogmatic liability within the humanities (Roustang 1986). 
^8	  To my knowledge, Jacqueline Rose’s widely-used introduction to Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the école freudienne, first published in 1982, was then the only discussion of Lacan’s mirror stage to refer to Winnicott’s ‘Mirror-role of Mother and Family’ (reprinted in Rose 1986: 53). However, it’s worth noting that, in 1975, her seminal discussion on ‘The Imaginary’, presented in response to what Rose described, even then, as the ‘fairly loose’ uses of that concept in film studies, was silent on Winnicott (Rose 1986: 168).
^9	  See Clark 2006. Les Mots Pour Le Dire is the title of Marie Cardinal’s extraordinary account of her analysis, first published in 1975. 
^10	  Rose’s concern that that orthodoxy was then blocking access to the work of Melanie Klein; in light of the ‘two waves’ of Lacanian film theory, it might well have blocked access to Lacan, too. 
^11	  Certainly, at the one-day conference accompanying the launch of Little Madnesses, there was an identifiable theme in the questions from the audience: crudely: ‘Where is the unconscious in all this?’ 
